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ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes the long-term prospects of profitably harvesting the forests in northwestern Russia in a
sustainable manner, indicating the potential short- to medium-term competitiveness of the Russian forestry in both domestic and
international markets. We have chosen a systemic approach (a modification of Porter’s Diamond) to investigate the threats to and
possibilities of the Russian forestry. This means that we consider not only factor conditions, but also demand conditions, the
presence and status of related and supporting industries, firm strategy, structure, and rivalry, and the role of government in creating
a competitive Russian forestry. Our analysis of the factor conditions prevailing in the mid to late 1990s indicates that the prospects
for the Russian forestry could be very good. However, this potential will be realized only if substantial problems can be solved
with regard to revising government policy, clarifying property rights, developing and maintaining the infrastructure, and
achieving a stable and not too rapid increase in costs. Furthermore, we think that domestic demand is a weak link and that a
revitalization of this demand is necessary.
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RÉSUMÉ. Cet article offre une analyse des perspectives à long terme d’une exploitation forestière rentable et durable des forêts
du nord-ouest de la Russie, analyse qui souligne la compétitivité potentielle à court et à moyen terme de l’industrie forestière russe
sur les marchés domestique comme international. On a choisi une approche systémique (une version du losange de Porter) pour
étudier les éléments qui constituent une menace pour l’industrie forestière russe et ceux qui représentent des ouvertures. Ce qui
signifie qu’on ne considère pas seulement les conditions des facteurs mais aussi les conditions de la demande, la présence et le
statut des industries connexes et dérivées, la stratégie des entreprises de même que leur structure et leur rivalité, ainsi que le rôle
du gouvernement dans la création d’une industrie forestière russe concurrentielle. Notre analyse des conditions des facteurs
prédominantes du milieu à la fin des années 1990 révèle que les perspectives pour l’industrie forestière russe pourraient être très
bonnes. Ce potentiel ne se concrétisera toutefois qu’après la résolution de problèmes majeurs visant la révision de la politique
gouvernementale, la clarification des droits de propriété, le développement et le maintien de l’infrastructure, ainsi que la
réalisation d’un accroissement stable et assez lent des coûts. On croit de plus que la demande nationale constitue un maillon fragile
et qu’une revitalisation de cette demande s’impose.
Mots clés: compétitivité, forêt, losange de Porter, Russie, transition
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INTRODUCTION
Forest Resources in Russia
The forests and forest industry of the Former Soviet Union
(FSU) have long been one of the most important suppliers
of wood raw materials in Europe. The ability (or inability)
of the FSU to use these vast resources effectively could
have an enormous impact on the forest raw material trade
in northern Europe. The Russian share is about 94% of the
FSU’s total growing stock, or 96% of the allowable har-
vest in the FSU (Moscow Academy of Sciences of the
USSR, 1991). In 1993, the FSU was the world’s
second-largest gross exporter (and largest net exporter) of
roundwood (FAO, 1993). (We use “roundwood” as a
common name for forest raw material intended for pulp-
wood or saw timber.) Total exports in 1993 amounted to
7 215 000 m3 solid volume. The world price of Russian
roundwood is hard to find, but we can compare the prices
paid for Russian softwood at the Swedish border to com-
petitors’ prices. These are not really prices, but rather the
unit cost at the border: US$ per m3, including cost, insur-
ance and freight. For example, the 1993 price for Russian
pulpwood was $34.10, about 10% lower than the $37.30
paid for German pulpwood (Exchange rate: 7.803 SEK/
$US; Swedish Board of Forestry, 1996). Russian prices
seem very competitive, but the price difference also re-
flects some differences in quality (see, for example,
Bergfors et al., 1989; R. Andersson, pers. comm. 1997).
The profound transformation of the country’s political
and economic systems that began in the late 1980s and early
1990s has created a number of uncertainties. For example,
what are the viability and the role of the FSU’s forest
industry in the emerging market economy setting? In this
paper, we define the term “forest industry” in a wider sense,
to include the harvesting enterprises and the next level in
the development chain, such as sawmills and fiberboard or
pulp and paper plants. What we call “forest enterprises” are
mainly concerned with harvesting operations.
The present study analyzes the prospects of profit-
ably harvesting the forests in northwestern Russia in a
sustainable manner over the long term and indicates the
industry’s potential competitiveness in the domestic
and international markets in the 21st century. The
northwestern region includes the Republic of Karelia,
the Republic of Komi, and the oblasts (provinces or
subregions) of Archangelsk, Vologodsk, and Murmansk.
Insofar as possible, given data availability, the analysis
includes all these regions. Backman (1995) reports
three main findings: First, the availability of new capi-
tal is crucial; second, total exports from Russia will
decline unless the infrastructure is expanded and new
harvesting technologies are used; and third, policies
that will ensure high sustainable harvests over the long
term need to be put into practice. Backman (1994,
1995, 1996a,b) has covered the physical availability of
the forest resources in the FSU in some detail. We have
added to his contributions a more detailed discussion of
costs, markets, and the structure of forestry companies,
as well as the impact of government policy (or, in some
cases, lack thereof) on the forest enterprises, particu-
larly those in northwestern Russia.
The northern economic region has played a leading role
in the development of the Russian forest sector. In 1997,
its share of Russian forestry industry output was about
35% for roundwood and more than 13% for saw timber.
This region also accounted for almost half of the total
paper production in the Russian Federation (Forest Com-
plex of the Russian Federation, 1998).
The current social and economic crisis in Russia is an
effect of the earlier administrative command system. Most
of the industries in the FSU had already begun to lag
behind those of developed countries in the early 1970s.
One result of ignoring the requirements of a “normal”
market economy was irrational decisions about where to
locate large forest industry capacities for roundwood
processing. For example, several enterprises were located
in the Far East and Siberia. The transition to a market
economy immediately revealed such flaws and “punished”
badly located enterprises with high transportation and
energy costs. We may also point out other flaws, such as
inappropriate harvesting, ignoring economies of scale,
and simply producing the wrong products.
COMPETITIVENESS IN AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE AND THE PORTER FRAMEWORK
Introduction
There is a long history of efforts to explain competitive-
ness in international trade. The classical theory is that of
comparative advantage (e.g., Jepma et al., 1996). That is,
if a country is relatively well endowed with a resource such
as labor (or, as in the Russian case, vast forests), this gives
the country its comparative advantage. This theory pre-
dicts that a country will be competitive and produce in
industries where it has a comparative advantage, recogniz-
ing that market forces will allocate a nation’s resources to
those industries where the resources are relatively most
productive. The theory of comparative advantage, which
is based on factors of production, has intuitive appeal, and
national differences in factor costs have historically played
a role in determining trade patterns in many industries.
Russian forests are among the largest in the world.
Labor costs do not seem to be prohibitive. Thus, using the
theory of comparative advantage, it would be easy to
conclude that northwestern Russia is highly competitive in
the international roundwood market because of its vast
forest inventories and its relatively cheap labor. Still,
exports of roundwood have decreased dramatically de-
spite a collapsing domestic Russian market. We believe
that the standard methods of analyzing potential competi-
tiveness ignore several important issues. One issue that
requires attention is the impact of the institutional setting
within a country. The theory of comparative advantage
implicitly assumes an efficient use of production factors,
leaving little role for the effects of organizational structure
and institutions on economic growth. Another overlooked
issue is the impact of domestic demand. Even though we
are analyzing a raw material, roundwood, customers are
increasingly demanding high-quality products (freshness
and correct harvesting and measurement methods are among
the criteria). The domestic demand for high-quality
roundwood puts pressure on the suppliers and encourages
them to improve, thus making it easier to meet increas-
ingly tougher international quality requirements. Finally,
bringing in the issue of supporting and related industries
would further enhance the analysis. If these industries are
strong in an international perspective, they should
strengthen competitiveness in the domestic market.
The Porter Framework
To investigate the threats and possibilities in Russian
forestry, we have chosen a systemic approach first sug-
gested by Porter (1990). The “resource-based theory”
developed during the 1990s (Westgren, 1994) also fits
well into the way we use the Porter framework. According
to Porter, the answer to whether a particular industry in a
country is competitive or not lies in four broad attributes
of the country. These attributes, individually and as a
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system, constitute the “diamond” of national advantage,
the playing field that each nation establishes and operates
for its industries. These attributes, the determinants of
competitiveness, are the following:
• Factor conditions: The nation’s position in factors of
production, such as labor and capital.
• Demand conditions: The nature of the domestic
market.
• Related and supporting industries: The presence or
absence of such industries and its impact upon
competitiveness.
• Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry: The conditions
in the nation governing how companies are created,
organized, and managed, as well as the nature of
domestic rivalry.
Included in the model is another attribute: chance.
Chance influences the determinants, but is not, according
to Porter, a determinant itself. Chance includes events like
oil shocks and wars that change the conditions inside the
diamond and put pressure on the determinants. An oil
shock, for example, raises input costs, lowers demand, and
creates a disadvantage in factor conditions.
Porter also considers government to be an attribute
outside the diamond. He considers the government to be
“part of the game” influencing the four determinants (e.g.,
through subsidies, education, and policies related to the
financial markets) with its basic role of supporting innova-
tion and upgrading. The government can act as a major
buyer of goods, thereby influencing domestic demand. It
can also use regulations and standards to influence quality
or the production process. Substantial changes inside the
diamond, that is, in the interaction between determinants
or within a determinant, can also trigger actions from the
government. Higher production costs, for example, can
lead to a devaluation of the currency.
Strength in a determinant (e.g., being relatively well
endowed with forests and skilled labor) means that this part
of the diamond will strengthen international competitive-
ness. But because the diamond works as a system, a weak
determinant could be enough to seriously impede competi-
tiveness (e.g., if the structure of industry firms does not
promote productivity and the upgrading of quality).
Porter’s approach to competitiveness in certain indus-
tries has been used previously, for example, with respect to
iron ore (Hellmer, 1997). Hellmer found that several as-
pects of the “diamond-analysis” were applicable to ex-
plain the survival of LKAB (a Swedish mining company)
despite toughening international competition.
Some criticism of Porter’s model is based on the view
that an advanced domestic demand is crucial for success.
Auerbach and Skott (1994) mention the example of the
Japanese audio industry, which in the beginning was met
by quite an unsophisticated domestic demand, yet has
upgraded and is now a world leader. Further, they criticize
the way Porter dismisses the notion that low prices on
factors of production can lead to a long-term competitive
advantage, mentioning South Korea’s low wage strategy in
the 1960s as one example. To this criticism, we would like
to add that the lack of clear definitions of the determinants
weakens the theory. Yet there has also been ample support
for Porter’s theory: Ergas (1984) identifies several of the
factors that Porter incorporates in his diamond, and Kogut
(1991) seems to agree with Porter almost completely.
The Modified Diamond
In this study, we use five rather than four determinants
of competitive advantage to systematize the analysis:
factor conditions; demand conditions; the presence and
status of related and supporting industries; firm strategy,
structure, and rivalry; and finally, the impact of the gov-
ernment on the industry. Van den Bosch and de Man
(1994) criticize Porter for placing the government outside
the diamond. Instead, they argue that this attribute could
very well be inside the diamond, in that micro-economic
policies aimed at specified industries through a product’s
life cycle could qualify the government as a fifth determi-
nant. This criticism seems valid and it is crucial in our case
to include the government’s actions (and sometimes its
inactivity) in the analysis of the Russian forestry. Govern-
ment action is crucial to competitiveness in a transitional
economy where the institutional setting is being created,
i.e., the rules of the market are changing, thus changing the
incentive structure of the participating actors. In Russia,
the government impact on the forest industry may be
direct, through legislation and fiscal policies, but it is
obvious that it affects transactions by affecting the infor-
mal rules currently existing in the Russian business sphere.
Further, the government still manages forests, or the old
nomenklatura remains in power in the forest enterprises.
Thus, our “Russian Forest Industry Diamond” will be
analyzed using the model in Figure 1, in which the at-
tributes interact and create what we define as a “competi-
tive advantage.”
The Diamond and Russia
Porter’s framework has ordinarily been used for analy-
sis of developed market economies, to mainly explain
success stories (e.g., Porter, 1990). Here, it is applied to
Russia and to a raw material supply industry.
Despite the shortcomings of the diamond framework, a
viable analysis within it is possible. Such analysis will
help put the endowment of factor conditions for the Rus-
sian forestry into perspective.
The first determinant of the diamond, factor conditions,
deals mainly with investigating production costs. The
second determinant focuses on domestic demand condi-
tions, which are assumed to be more dynamic. Here the
demand for quality is more important than quantity in the
process of creating a global competitive advantage. For
the forest enterprises to survive, we suggest that a critical
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mass of domestic demand is needed. Whereas Porter dis-
cusses the quality issues of demand, innovation, and up-
grading of products, the demand for “low-quality”
roundwood would help Russian forestry enterprises in our
case (compare with the Japanese audio industry example).
The third determinant, related and supporting indus-
tries, emphasizes the importance of an internationally
competitive supplier industry. In Russia, there are several
aspects of this to consider. First is what Porter considers
the synergy effects between vertically and horizontally
related industries that may share ideas and cooperate to
develop new technologies. In forestry, it is also important
to explore the status of the related industries, because most
capital equipment in the forest enterprises is Russian, and
maintenance and repair are heavily dependent on the
functioning of the firms in these related industries.
The fourth determinant summarizes the influence on
competitiveness of firm strategy, organization, and man-
agement and domestic rivalry. This category can include,
for example, the role of company goals (individuals’ or
investors’) and ideology. Several Russian forestry enter-
prises have been privatized, often as joint stock compa-
nies. In practice, the old nomenklatura has often remained
in power (e.g., Backman, 1996a) with the sector having the
same employees and management.
Our fifth determinant, government, is important from
two aspects. How is the government treating forests over
time? And how is the government interacting with firms
and regions? Our analysis follows van den Bosch and de
Man (1994) and shifts the focus from macroeconomic
issues to microeconomic issues.
Porter’s and other similar studies were done in a dy-
namic setting, often considering the changes in several
factors over time. What they could disregard, which we
cannot, is that we are exploring an industry in a post-
Communist market. This industry suffers in some sense
from the remaining institutions and structure of the com-
mand economy and has not yet adapted to the new condi-
tions of a market economy. What will be the future
government policies and regulations in this industry is
quite uncertain.
We assume that the ability to find a competitive position
in roundwood trade in the short run and to maintain this
position in the long run depends on the strength of the five
determinants in the diamond, their interdependence, and
their interaction with each other. The following analysis
covers the short to intermediate run, with some extensions
to the long-term possibilities of Russian forestry.
APPROACHING THE ISSUE OF COMPETITIVENESS
IN RUSSIAN FORESTRY
Factor Conditions and Endowments
The most important competitive advantage for Russia is
the availability of resources and skills. However, a
significant portion of the Russian forestry resource is
either physically or economically inaccessible.
In 1990, according to official figures, estimated stocks
of standing timber (i.e., growing trees) were 815 million m3
in the Republic of Karelia (henceforth Karelia) and
201 million m3 in the oblast of Murmanskaya (henceforth
Murmansk). In Karelia, this stock increased to 859 million m3
by 1995, whereas in Murmansk the inventory remained
unchanged. This inventory can be compared with the total
1990 inventory of neighboring areas such as Sweden
(2471 million m3), Finland (1679 million m3), and Poland
(1380 million m3) (Swedish Board of Forestry, 1996).
Thus the potential impact of northwestern Russia’s vast
resources on the Nordic roundwood trade is quite large. Of
course, the size of the inventory is unimportant if a signifi-
cant part of the resource is physically or economically
inaccessible.
In the northern region, a significant part of the forest
resources is also of low quality. Such unproductive stands
occupy 55% of the forested area in Murmansk, about 30%
in the republics of Komi and Archangelsk, and about 7%
in Karelia and Vologda. Large portions of the remaining
forest resources (all the forests in Murmansk and those in
the northern part of Komi and Archangelsk) are physically
and economically inaccessible. The economic inaccessi-
bility of the northern roundwood resources is mostly caused
by the drastic economic changes, i.e., very high rises in
energy prices and transport costs and obsolete equipment
and machines. If the economic situation in Russia changes
to a stable long-term equilibrium, with less volatility in
input prices and lower interest rates that would make re-
investment possible, these regions could profitably har-
vest the forest’s resources. Further, an improvement of the
economic situation could also lead to more effective forest
management, e.g., better forest reproduction methods. The
transitional period from a command to a market economy
FIG. 1. The Porter Diamond modified for the Russian situation to include
government as a fifth determinant.
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has seen silvicultural practices decline in quality and
intensity. For example, in the northern region the mainte-
nance of coniferous plantations to the age of final harvest-
ing is very low, only about 20 – 30% of the entire area. As
a result, the share of economically inaccessible stands will
increase.
Following the practice of others (e.g., Obersteiner,
1995), we use the annual allowable harvest as a guide for
the potential harvest. Table 1 shows that the harvests are
far below the allowable amounts. The figure for Murmansk
may reflect the low commercial value of much of that
region’s forests. The comparatively high figure for the
Republic of Karelia and the relatively low figure for
Vologodsk are surprising. The government of the Repub-
lic of Komi has made futile attempts to support the repub-
lic’s harvesting enterprises. The lack of capital usually
means that programs like those discussed in Komi are
never implemented.
The starting point for the cost analysis is the careful
compilation of data on product volumes and costs under-
taken by the Institute for Productive Forces and Natural
Resources (KEPS) of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
called the Translu Project. Official exchange rates are used
throughout in converting the ruble figures into U.S. dol-
lars. Although the ruble exchange rate was not determined
in a free market, Russian authorities adjusted it during the
period between 1990 and 1995, thus reflecting underlying
economic conditions.
Costs in US$ per m3 for four enterprises in Karelia and
one in Murmansk are available. The costs cover roundwood
harvesting and chip production, transported over land by
truck or train. Table 2 shows that the absolute costs have
gone down in three of the five cases, most dramatically in
Murmansk. If these costs are correct, this region has been
transformed into a very competitive producer of
roundwood, compared to the other regions. The harvesting
costs in northwestern Russia are equivalent to those in
Germany ($US 29.95 in 1990 and $US 23.00 in 1995) and
the Canadian West ($US 19.00 in 1990 and $US 22.00 in
1995, numbers kindly provided by H. Ekstrom, Wood
Resources Inc., Seattle, Washington, pers. comm. 1997).
A phenomenon of decreasing costs in northwestern Russia
can be seen. This, of course, is in part a reflection of the
problems with the exchange rate we are using. In 1990, the
Soviet Government fixed the exchange rate of the ruble,
which was overstated in comparison to its purchasing
power. By contrast, the 1995 exchange rate may have
undervalued the ruble in order to increase exports.
The economic crisis and the transition have led to an
increase in specific input costs, such as energy and capital
(see Table 3). The costs of the trees themselves (included
in materials as the stumpage cost) are about 2–3% of the
total costs, a cost that has historically been an administra-
tively set cost, usually set to zero or some nominal amount.
As can be seen in Table 3, the fuel cost share has almost
doubled in most cases, and the materials share in some
cases has more than doubled. Only in Murmansk has the
share of wages gone up. There are some problems in
interpreting the reported rises in other costs.
Care should be taken when using the above enterprise
accounting data. First, the costs may be inflated to avoid
tax. We suspect that this may be the case if the figure in the
other costs column in Table 3 is higher than 15%. Also, a
significant part of the enterprises’ harvest volume is sold
in barter, thus in part avoiding taxes. (In practice, barter is
a rather costly way of trading. Linz and Krueger [1998]
provide a good analysis of the effects of barter on the
restructuring of Russian enterprises.)
A very important factor in the extraction of roundwood
from the Russian forests is the accessibility of the re-
source. Currently, the railway is using only part of its
freight carrying capacity, a fact related to the sharp drop in
both freight and passenger transportation from 1992 to
1996. Many railroad cars and locomotives are outdated,
beyond or close to their life limit. The relatively new part
of the railroad’s capacity was sufficient in 1996 to accom-
modate current volumes, as well as the increased volume
expected before the year 2000 (Russian Academy of Sci-
ences, KEPS, Translu project, 1996). Furthermore, trans-
port tariffs in this industry rose by 28% between 1995 and
1996. If unused capacity exists, the price should be lower.
(Unconfirmed sources in 1998 denied that this had hap-
pened. Instead, prices had risen to prohibitively high
levels.)
Despite the obvious advantage of trading in the export
market (the risk of default is less and the payments are in
hard currency), exports have gone down. Table 4 summa-
rizes what has happened to the exported volume in the
TABLE 2. Costs (in $US per m3) of roundwood and chip production
in selected forest enterprises.
Location Roundwood Chips
1990 1995 1990 1995
Northwest, average 24.82 23.74 18.72 16.00
Karelia, average 23.75 23.74 18.13 16.00
Kem 27.60 21.51 19.88 –
Kondopoga 25.13 27.60 18.38 16.44
Pudozh 20.38 19.96 17.50 15.89
Suojarvi 19.88 24.44 16.38 14.89
Murmansk 34.63 23.64 26.25 –
Source: Russian Academy of Sciences, KEPS, 1996, Translu project.
TABLE 1. Actual harvest as a percentage of annual allowable
harvest in the northern region of Russia, 1996.
Subregion All Species Coniferous
Archangelsk 0.37 0.41
Vologodsk 0.30 0.45
Murmansk 0.17 0.18
Republic of Karelia 0.60 0.62
Republic of Komi 0.18 0.21
Source: Russian Academy of Sciences, KEPS, 1996, Translu project.
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1990s. This decrease is quite puzzling, since domestic
demand has all but vanished (see below). However, the
rate of decrease of exports is much slower than the corre-
sponding rate of decrease in roundwood harvests. As a
consequence, the ratio of exports to total roundwood
production has increased from 10.3% in 1990 to 21.3% in
1997. For chemical pulps, the corresponding figures are
35.8% in 1990 and 81.9% in 1997 (Burdin, 1998).
Although the main conclusion is that northwestern
Russia is well endowed with forest resources and that the
costs of harvesting seem internationally competitive, ex-
ports have still gone down. This suggests that the factor
endowment theory provides only part of the answer to the
question of Russia’s competitiveness in forestry.
Domestic Demand
Domestic demand is important to the harvesting enter-
prise, since it will decide the mix of forest harvested and
regenerated and also the type of harvesting done, i.e.,
thinnings (for quality purposes) or final harvests. It is also
possible that technological breakthroughs in pulp or saw-
mills will lead to a change in the quality of raw material
needed. This could help domestic raw material suppliers
insofar as they are able to meet changing demand condi-
tions. Domestic use, which in 1961 accounted for 98% of
the harvested volume, slowly declined to 86% of the final
harvest in the FSU in 1994 (FAOSTAT).
The domestic demand for roundwood in Russia has
historically paid more attention to quantity than to quality
issues. This causes problems in the current situation when
the forest enterprises are seeking to export a rising share
of production. Buyers of saw timber in Western Europe
demand high-quality roundwood, but Russian firms often
fail to understand these requirements. Although the know-
how is there, it has been proven somewhat difficult to
meet the high demand for exports when domestic demand
is still quite low. Eronen and Simula (1993) report that the
Soviet paper industry produces more than 800 different
types of paper, but that most of it is of rather inferior
quality. The lack of test equipment and market orientation
at the Russian pulp and paper mills severely restricts their
competitiveness.
Table 5 summarizes the production capacities and pro-
duction volume for some of the larger enterprises in the
northwestern part of Russia. Although these are aggre-
gated data, they give a general picture of the situation in
the late 1990s. The decline in capacity utilization is dra-
matic.  In 1996 the Republic of Komi and the
Archangelskaya oblast, using only 50 – 75% of their total
capacity in 1996, were still using far more of the existing
capacity than Leningradskaya oblast, Vologodskaya oblast,
and the republic of Karelia. For the Russian forestry sector
as a whole, the capacity utilization figures are as follows:
fiberboard 43%, particle board 35%, plywood 50%, pulp
38%, paper 49%, and paper board 29% (Moiseev et al.,
1997). Some of the largest pulp mills operated for only one
to six months in 1997. In the short run (and possibly in the
long run), the heavy drop in capacity utilization in the
forest industry, ceteris paribus, should mean that more
roundwood is available for exports. However, in the short
run, the same factors that caused the drop in the production
of pulp and lumber (such as an insufficient monetary
system, missing markets, and insufficient domestic de-
mand) also caused a drop in roundwood production.
One of the more obvious explanations of the demand
implosion is the rate of increase in input prices. From 1995
to 1996, the prices of roundwood rose by 12%. This was
quite small compared to price increases for electricity
(35%) and oil (40%) in the same period (Moiseev et al.,
1997). If these relative changes correctly reflect the long-
term equilibrium (or at least the direction), then more
intensive use of roundwood, versus energy, is expected.
However, in many cases these rising input costs have
meant negative profits; the forest sector as a whole is in
debt (Moiseev et al., 1997).
TABLE 3. Roundwood production cost structure, by area and enterprise and main cost categories, 1990 and 1995 (% of total costs). Costs
delivered at central yard.
Area/Enterprise Materials Fuel Wages Depreciation Other Costs
% of Total  % of Total  % of Total  % of Total  % of Total
1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995
Karelia, average 21.9 33.9 4.1 7.8 37.8 32.3 28.4 8.8 7.8 17.2
Kem 14.3 32.1 4.9 8.0 33.0 35.1 36.6 13.7 11.2 11.1
Kondopoga 19.2 29.8 3.1 7.3 42.2 31.3 26.4 12.0 9.1 19.6
Pudozh 20.2 35.8 3.9 7.0 30.9 30.5 31.2 7.0 13.8 19.7
Suojarvi 26.4 35.4 5.2 7.7 39.9 33.7 27.2 7.2 1.3 16.0
Murmansk, average 24.8 23.1 7.8 15.4 39.5 41.9 30.8 9.6 6.4 10.0
Source: Russian Academy of Sciences, KEPS, 1996, Translu project.
TABLE 4. Russian roundwood exports, 1990 – 97.
Year Volume (1000 m3) Value ($US) Average Price ($US/m3)
1990 31 400 1 720 000 54.80
1995 18 400 1 065 000 57.80
1996 15 914 0 945 400 59.00
1997 17 699 1 016 900 57.00
Source: Kozhukov (1998).
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As a result of the economic crisis that Russia has
suffered, valuable infrastructure may be lost and forest
enterprises may disappear for lack of domestic demand.
We suggest that smaller quantities be exported; the ex-
ported volumes add important profits to the forest enter-
prises but are not in many cases the bulk. The demand for
Russian roundwood abroad is limited in volume, to some
extent because of quality concerns. The remaining compa-
nies of the Russian forestry sector do not have equipment
that is modern enough to handle the requirements of the
export markets. Therefore, an implosion of domestic de-
mand could lead to a distinct decrease in exported vol-
umes, such as is seen in Table 4. The capital requirements
are lower for harvesting than for processing (e.g., paper or
sawmills). In the medium to long run, this fact makes
harvesting operations less sensitive than processing indus-
tries to ongoing changes.
One interesting question: Will domestic demand grow
before the forest industry is dead? As of the end of 1998, the
domestic demand for quality wood is still declining, reflect-
ing in part the declining purchasing power of Russians. This
is the crucial issue for one of our conclusions: that there may
exist a necessary critical mass of domestic demand that
makes it possible for the forest industry to survive.
One solution to the problems of low know-how and
worn-out capital stock in the Russian forestry processing
industry would be foreign direct investment (FDI). Ac-
cording to the State Committee of Statistics, foreign in-
vestments in all Russian industries in 1995 were $US 1.2
billion, or roughly 3% of total investment (foreign and
domestic). (In 1994, the corresponding figures were $US
1.05 billion, of which $US 549 million was direct invest-
ment.) The preferred objects of FDI are food (24%), fuel
and energy (22%), and forest and forest products (13%).
Unfortunately, there are several reports of failures of
FDI in Russia. Backman (1996a) describes the joint ven-
ture in Russia of Weyerhaeuser, an American company.
Tak (1994) and van Fossen (1995) have somewhat differ-
ent opinions on how to describe the operations in Russia of
Hyundai (a Korean company), but both report them as a
failure. Finally, Nilsson and Söderholm (2000) briefly
describe the costly project of ASSIDomän (a Swedish
company) in Russia, as well as the importance of function-
ing institutions to attract FDI. Further, Myllynen (1996:111)
reports on Finnish firms active in Russia:
Many problems face Finnish timber harvesting
contractors. The working conditions are different due
to the inadequacy of the infrastructure…Decaying trees
should be left in the forest when complying with the
Finnish directives, but in Russia the harvester will be
penalized for doing so. As a result, timber extraction
work is technically more complicated in Russia.
In Western Europe and North America, there has been
pressure for all silvicultural activities and manufacturing
to be environmentally friendly. This has only recently
become an issue in Russia. Thus, Russian manufacturers
of pulp, paper, and paperboard do not meet reasonable
environmental standards. Further, a significant part of this
branch of the forest industry has an obsolete capital stock
(40 – 50 years old). In the case of fiberboard production,
most of the equipment was imported. As the current lack
of funds available to Russian firms makes it impossible to
re-invest, or to even buy spare parts, capacity in that
industry is slowly decreasing.
The core conclusions of this section are that the implo-
sion of domestic demand for forest products may be
devastating for forest enterprises. Exports could be one
remedy to this problem, but the low quality of Russian
products makes this unlikely. Foreign direct investment
could also help, but since FDI has been more hindered than
accommodated up until the late 1990s, it has not proven to
be a possible solution. Therefore, the domestic demand for
roundwood is weak in two senses. First, it does not raise
the quality of production, as suggested by the Porter
model. Second, the demand is small because of the general
implosion of the Russian economy.
TABLE 5. Production of forest products in some northwestern Russian enterprises, 1996.
Region Product Production Capacity Production Volume Capacity Utilization
Republic of Karelia wood pulp 127.5 40.9 0.32
paper 995 551.1 0.55
sawn wood 1098 270.4 0.25
Republic of Komi wood pulp 345 212 0.61
paper 468.5 313 0.67
sawn wood 200 147 0.73
Archangelskaya oblast wood pulp 1503.4 1021.3 0.68
paper 1038.3 541.5 0.52
sawn wood 0 0
Vologodskaya oblast wood pulp 106.8 26.5 0.32
paper 109.4 28.2 0.39
sawn wood 200 30.1 0.34
Leningradskaya oblast wood pulp 599.5 180.8 0.30
paper 446.5 180.5 0.40
sawn wood 0 0
Source: Russian Academy of Sciences, KEPS, 1996, Translu project.
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Related Industries
The national presence of related competitive industries
often leads to an advantage in keeping a competitive
position. One example of this is the very competitive
manufacturers of forest machinery associated with the
Swedish and Finnish forest industries. Local manufacture
of machinery has helped keep forestry productivity high,
thereby keeping the costs of harvesting in the Nordic
countries competitive. An example is the technological
development of harvesters or skidders adapted to local
conditions. One of Porter’s (1990) stronger findings in his
study of competitive advantage was that competitive in-
dustries were often associated with specialized research
institutes or university departments. It is a well-known
fact that the financial problems of the Russian state have
had a devastating impact on Russian universities.
Manufacturers of forest equipment in Russia produce
machinery such as chain saws, skidders, harvesters, and
pulp boilers. However, Russia is not equipped to make
certain equipment for the next step in the processing chain,
such as machinery for the production of veneer sheets,
structural composite goods, and various kinds of high-
quality paper and paperboard. Many of the equipment manu-
facturers that do exist should still be considered monopolies
(i.e., they are the only manufacturers within the Russian
Federation, and few foreign firms have chosen to enter the
Russian market). Many enterprises are forced to borrow
money at rates as high as 30 – 50%. (The high interest rates
reflect, of course, the high demand for credit and high risk
of default, as well as factors like inflationary expectations.)
Only part of the existing forest equipment industry can
be considered as state of the art. Moiseev et al. (1997)
estimates that about 20% of the products made are com-
parable to products assembled outside Russia. This situa-
tion differs from branch to branch.
In the logging equipment industry, the prices for do-
mestic equipment are often far below those of foreign
(e.g., Finnish or Canadian) competitors. At the same time,
Russian equipment (for logging as well as woodworking)
is inferior regarding productivity, labor working condi-
tions, and safety. Moreover, the relatively lower costs of
domestic machinery are largely based on low-level wages.
In the long run, substantial increases in productivity are
needed to keep the industry competitive when facing an
expected increase in labor costs.
The educational level and skills of the workers in the
logging industry are good (one of the Swedish companies
actively logging in Russia confirmed this; K. Boström,
pers. comm. 1997). But the sector is losing forestry scien-
tists because of missing payments to universities and re-
search institutes. For example, research on pulp and paper
has all but vanished. In the early 1990s, the former Soviet
states, including Russia, were cooperating on research
concerning silvicultural and logging equipment. However,
the termination of this cooperation in the general mayhem
may result in the loss of a potential domestic market for
forest machinery. Only a small share of the few remaining
professors and lecturers from the forestry institutes and
universities are currently engaged in any research.
The related and supporting industries, as Porter defines
them, exist in Russian forestry; however, we noticed sev-
eral problems upon studying these industries. First, there
exists in several cases an imperfect market structure with
monopoly situations. Second, these industries, like most
industries, were hard hit when costs rose to meet the
demands of the “new” market situation. Until they make
the necessary transformations in production and business
planning, they will remain a weak part of our Russian
forest industry diamond. Finally, only about 20% of the
industry produces state-of-the-art products.
Firm Structure and Rivalry
This determinant of Porter’s diamond includes the con-
text in which business firms are created, organized, and
managed. This context is important in the Russian case,
since the forest enterprises had not, as of late 1998, found
a satisfactory structure of ownership and organization.
The change in ownership structure has not led to the rise in
efficiency and productivity that is so badly needed. This
failure may be an effect of the insiders’ domination, in that
no real change of management has occurred. We cannot
report an exact figure, but in our opinion the 48% of
insider-dominated firms reported in Earle and Estrin (1996)
seems to be a lower bound for the forest industry. Quite the
contrary of higher effectiveness has occurred: between
1994 and 1997, the share of unprofitable enterprises in the
forest industry rose from 45.5% to 84.2% (Russian Statis-
tics Yearbook, 1998).
To quote Stiglitz (1994:136), “More important in many
cases than changing the ‘ownership’ is changing the mar-
ket structure—subjecting these enterprises to competi-
tion.” This has hardly happened in the Russian forestry
industry. Furthermore, the existing bankruptcy law has not
been enforced, and many enterprises have increasingly
huge debts. Seemingly, with the current owners there is no
future. In the northwestern region, the share of unprofit-
able enterprises ranged from 70.4% in Vologodsk to 89.7%
in Komi (Russian Statistics Yearbook, 1998). Still, these
companies do not go bankrupt.
A common theme of the transition literature is that
successful restructuring of firms is necessary to transform
from a planned to a market economy (Linz and Krueger,
1998). It seems that in many cases Russian forestry enter-
prises have adopted a defensive restructuring mode: that
is, they seek to “change as little as possible while retaining
insider control” (Ash and Hare, 1994:633).
In general, the forest enterprises have not adapted to the
new economy, in that they have not learned how to act in
the marketplace, or how to understand and adapt to new
market conditions. In these areas, they are still in the
learning stages, although some firms in some industries
are beginning to shift their attention from short-term
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actions to formulating strategies for long-term viability
(Clark and Baglione, 1998). For example, the stock of
ownership shares was in many cases sold at prices a
thousand times below the value of possible production.
Russian forestry enterprises have developed a sense of
orientation towards costs, but not towards markets. Many
firms rely on their ability to respond to the market by
reducing costs, but do little to create a market or change their
output (for a good example, see Clark and Baglione, 1998).
Tackling the severe shortage of financial capital is usually
seen as beyond the capabilities of the individual enterprise.
It is hard to conceive of a viable Russian low-cost
strategy. To stay competitive in the long run, Russian
forestry firms must either accommodate foreign leases and
harvesting crews or increase the quality of their output.
These enterprises need to make quite an effort in order to
improve their “products.”
Before 1992, international trade in forest products was
highly centralized and carried out by specialized foreign
trade organizations. Efforts to liberalize trade policies
began in 1992, when the ruble was made convertible to
hard currencies at a constant exchange rate. Since that
time, the role of the centralized organizations has been
reduced, and some of them have been privatized or abol-
ished. Enterprise-to-enterprise trade is now allowed, and
the former export taxes and export quotas have been
phased out (World Bank, 1997).
One of the more serious problems of the Russian inter-
national trade policy is the lack of stability. There is no
guarantee that the current customs tariffs, as well as other
rules, will remain unchanged. In the late 1990s, many
small exporters characterized the market. Since most of
them had neither the knowledge of how international
markets function nor information on price trends in the
foreign markets, the export prices from different regions
might vary substantially. In December 1998, for example,
the price per cubic meter of birch veneer logs varied
between $25 and $50 U.S. (Russian Statistics Yearbook,
1998). This ignorance of the quality requirements for
foreign markets and of changes in prices and trends may be
one explanation of why Russian prices remain substan-
tially lower than those of competitors.
The lack of competition in many industries prolongs the
time it will take for Russian companies to become interna-
tionally competitive. Further, there is some indication that
firms concentrate too much on cutting production costs,
and forget that they need to sell something that is in
demand. We have found another weak determinant in our
Russian “diamond.”
Government
The Forest Code adopted by the state Duma in January
1997 (World Bank, 1997) can be considered a new stage in
forest legislation. Unfortunately, in several important as-
pects it is out of line with the current social, economical,
and environmental way of thinking.
The fundamental issues of land and forest ownership
and management responsibilities are difficult to address
until appropriate land legislation is implemented. How-
ever, the current lack of discussion concerning these im-
portant issues in the new code has left a lacuna that will add
to the already existing confusion. The Russian constitu-
tion provides for the possibility of various forms of own-
ership (private, state, municipal, or other) of natural
resources, including land and forests. Moreover, some
regions in the Russian Federation, e.g., the Republic of
Tatarstan and the Saratov Region, have declared some
land as privately owned. The current legislation of many
republics and regions (krai, oblasts) proposes that all state-
owned forestland should be transferred to them. Contra-
rily, the Forest Code proposes that all state forests remain
under federal ownership (article 19) and allows only a
partial transfer of the state forest to the republics. More-
over, there is an imbalance between ownership rights and
responsibilities of the Russian Federation and those of the
republics and regions. Although the Russian Federation
owns the forest, the republics and regions are responsible
for forest resource use, protection, and regeneration.
Although the Forest Code declares that a fundamental
requirement of the forest managers is to use the forests in
a sustainable manner over the long run, it fails to provide
legal or economic mechanisms for implementing such
policies. The Forest Code is generally of a regulatory
nature, lacking the incentives for increasing the effective-
ness of forest resource use and reproduction.
Another important way in which government influ-
ences industry is through the currency exchange rate. In
the long run, the exchange rate should convert to a level
that neither helps nor hinders Russian exporting indus-
tries. What should matter is the relative advantage of the
different industries (even widely interpreted in the “Por-
ter-context”). The argument can be made that for a transi-
tion economy, which is presumably out of equilibrium,
exchange rates may profoundly distort the economy. That
is, high exchange rates increase costs for enterprises de-
pendent on foreign material, making it difficult for them to
reach an equilibrium point. On the other hand, in our case,
high exchange rates to some extent protect the industry
from foreign competition, making it easier for the enter-
prise to keep or expand its domestic market shares. The
outcome is, therefore, ambiguous. Hence, we follow Wibe
(1987) and leave this issue.
According to the office of the Russian procurator-
general (quoted on TV-News, Moscow, 27 December
1998), about half of the commercial banks, 40% of the
state-owned companies, and 60% of private companies are
under the control of criminal elements (organized crime).
This informal controlling element may hamper the gov-
ernment, limiting its ability to implement policies.
To summarize, the role of the government is extremely
important in a transitional economy, yet in some cases we
see an appalling lack of policy. The institutional setting of
the old Communist system—with gifts to administrators
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and widespread corruption—remains. We suggest that
government is as important a determinant as the factor
conditions in the Russian case. Its weakness may unfortu-
nately counterbalance the strength of the resource factor
conditions prevailing in Russia.
DISCUSSION
The survival and well-being of the Russian forestry
industry will ultimately depend on its competitiveness in
relation to other roundwood suppliers in the international
market. Competitiveness, in turn, is dependent on several
factors. Prospects for the Russian forestry could be very
good, but only if substantial problems are resolved in
regard to government policy, clarification of property
rights, development and maintenance of the infrastructure,
and a steady and not too rapid increase in costs. For the
Russian forestry to regain its earlier production and estab-
lish itself as the leading supplier of forest raw materials in
northern Europe, the domestic demand, considered a weak
link, must be revitalized.
Table 6, summarizing the judgements and opinions of
this paper, gives a rather dark picture of the likely near-
term competitiveness of the Russian forests. The only real
strengths, in the resource factor conditions and resource
endowment, are clearly not enough to make the Russian
forestry competitive. If the other determinants of this
system are not strengthened, the industry could, at least in
the near to medium run, produce roundwood at volumes
far below what would be sustainable in the long run.
An important factor in the manufacture of high-quality
pulp and lumber is the freshness of the raw material, which
requires efficiency from the moment the wood is harvested
to its arrival at the factory gate. This means that the
education of the personnel involved and the import of
know-how from Western economies are crucial factors.
The prospects for such transfers are good; however, the
two critical deterrents to this development are the bad
investment climate and the unstable institutional setting.
Several important changes are evident in the forestry
sector. We could be seeing a return to stronger central
planning if, for example, the central authorities should
regain power over forestry exports. The results of such a
return would depend on other factors, such as property
rights. Assuming clear property rights and a policy of
sustainable harvest, central planning could mean a less
effective use of the Russian forest resource than would be
possible in a free market.  But if property rights were to
remain weak and unclear, then stronger central planning
could lead to overuse of the forests, which Pöyry (1988)
claims has already occurred to some extent in Canada.
Another result might be the redirection or termination of
foreign direct investment. We agree with Backman (1996a)
that the influx of fresh capital is crucial for the forest
enterprises at this stage and that the Russian Duma should
regard foreign  investment as an issue of utmost importance.
The development of renewed domestic demand for
forest raw material is of great importance. The wood
products and pulp industry is suffering from some quality
problems. Furthermore, in a recent study, Linz and Krueger
(1998) found that in their sample of wood, forestry and
pulp and paper firms (1992–95) the labor productivity has
gone down in the worst case by 59.6% and in the best case
by “only” 11.6%.
Most of the forest raw material needs to be transported
long distances, and the Communist practice of heavily
subsidizing bulk transports has effectively ceased. The
heavy increase in transport tariffs in 1995–96 should be
seen as a warning.
To clarify the current situation and to identify long-term
possibilities for the Russian forest industry, further re-
search is needed on all this issues.
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TABLE 6. Russian forest in a diamond context.
Part of the Diamond Good Okay Bad Comment
Factor Conditions and endowment X
natural conditions X Large inventory
infrastructure X Good railway network, but some doubts of its maintenance
know-how X
Demand X Quality problems, lack of critical mass domestically
Foreign direct investment X Not good compared to other transitional economies
Related and supporting industries ?1 Monopolies, low productivity and fairly low quality
Firm strategy, structure and rivalry X Few changes and lack of renewal of management
Government X Unstable, at which level should decisions be taken?
legal setting X Widespread corruption, inappropriate taxation, unclear forest code
property rights ? Unclear, discussion between regional and federal level
1
 The question mark denotes that the position in the table is unclear. We need more information to make a more clear-cut statement.
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